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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
MENTAL ILLNESS, AND MEDICATION: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND HOPE FOR THE
FUTURE
Jennifer M. Jackson*
INTRODUCTION
When the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the "Act")
was passed in 1990, legislators, disability advocates, and
scholars had high expectations for the law's impact on the status
of the disabled in this country.' The purpose of the Act has
always been to eliminate "discrimination against individuals
with disabilities . . . [and] to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination . ."2 Instead,
a decade later, the statute's inadequacies were all too apparent,
with one critic noting that "[fif the ADA was meant to be a
revolutionary remaking of America, then the judicial
interpretation and implementation of the ADA's employment
title has been nothing less than a betrayal of the ADA's
promise."3 Specifically, in terms of Title I protection of
* J.D., Marquette University Law School, 2010; B.A., University of
Colorado at Boulder, 2004. I would like to thank the staff of the Elder's
Advisor Law Review for their assistance with this article. I further
wish to thank Professor Alison Barnes for her instruction and guidance
and, of course, my family for getting my through this twisting, turning
journey called law school.
1. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities
Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217,
217 (2008).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
3. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act,
35 GA. L. REV. 27, 36 (2000).
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individuals from employment discrimination based on
psychiatric disability, critics argue that this protection is nothing
more than a "delusion of rights."4
Throughout the ADA's history, mental illness has been the
fastest growing category of charges filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Agency (EEOC) each year.5
However, in attempting to define what a disability is, courts
appear to have been employing the very stereotypes and
prejudices against people with psychiatric disabilities that the
ADA was created to eradicate.6 This continuing bias has created
a long and difficult road for claimants with mental illness
seeking the protection of the ADA.
Further complicating the matter for courts and claimants
dealing with the issue of mental illness is how to treat the
medications used (or not used) to ameliorate the illness.
Mitigating measures have been a point of contention in ADA
litigation since the passage of the Act.7 Lower courts were
divided for years on how to address the issue until the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.' The
Sutton decision changed the way courts addressed mitigating
measures until another seismic shift occurred when Congress
overturned that decision in the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). 9
This article will trace the history of how medications for
mental illness have been treated throughout the ADA's history:
4. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV.
271, 271 (2000).
5. Kevin S. Wiley, Jr., Comment, Scaling Back the ADA: How the Sutton v.
United Air Lines Decision Affects Employees with Bipolar Disorder, 2 SCHOLAR 355, 372
(2000).
6. Stephanie Procter Miller, Comment, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and
Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 701,
702 (1997).
7. Sarah Shaw, Comment, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs
Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1981, 1984 (2002).
8. See generally Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
9. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat.
3-553, 3553-35)4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 12101).
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after the Act's passage; after the Supreme Court's decision in
Sutton; and following the passage of the ADAAA in 2008.
Through this lens, the article will contain a specific discussion of
how medications themselves can and have been viewed as
disabling under the Act and whether a plaintiff who chooses not
to medicate her mental illness can recover under the ADA.
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The ADA has its origins in the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act) of
1973, which provided protection from discrimination to people
with disabilities in federal employment, federal contracting, and
federally funded programs.10  ADA terminology such as
"qualified individual with a disability," "reasonable
accommodation," and "undue hardship" was drawn from the
Rehabilitation Act." The ADA expanded protection for people
with disabilities in most private and public employment
settings. Title I of the ADA generally covers any employer with
fifteen or more employees, 12 Title 11 prohibits discrimination by a
state or local government, and Title III prohibits discrimination
in places of public accommodation and specific services
operated by private entities.14 This article will primarily focus
on employment discrimination under Title I.
As the ADA stands now, "disability" is defined as "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." 5 Actual mental impairment includes mental
illness, mental retardation, dementia, cognitive limitations, or
any of a variety of other conditions recognized as mental
disorders and found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
10. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2006).
11. Miller, supra note 6, at 708.
12. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006).
13. Id. § 12131(1).
14. Id. § 12181.
15. Id. § 12102(1).
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Mental Disorders (DSM-IV).1 6 However, the definition of mental
impairment is not limited to the disorders described by the
DSM-IV. 17 The EEOC regulations define a mental impairment as
"[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities."" Title I states that an
employer shall not "discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability . . . in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, . . . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."19
Title I requires that an employer make "reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual" unless the employer can
demonstrate an undue hardship.2 0 The statute defines a
"qualified individual" as one "who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."2"
"Reasonable accommodation" is defined in the statute by way of
an illustrative - rather than exhaustive - list. Generally, the
examples include making existing facilities accessible to
individuals with disabilities, and other logistical suggestions,
such as job restructuring, to accommodate employees with
disabilities.22 The EEOC regulations further delineate the concept
by defining reasonable accommodation as "[m]odifications or
adjustments to the work environment . . . that enable a qualified
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of
that position; or . . . enjoy equal benefits and privileges of
employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated
16. MATTHEW BENDER & Co., TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 20.14(3)(a)
(2009); see also, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).
17. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., supra note 16, § 20.14(3)(a).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2009).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
20. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
21. Id. § 12111(8).
22. Id. § 12111(9).
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employees without disabilities." 23
An employer does not have to make reasonable
accommodations if it can prove that doing so would be an
undue hardship, which the statute defines as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense." 24 Similarly, if the
employer can demonstrate that the employee is a "direct threat,"
that is, that he or she poses "a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation,"2 5 then the employer may not be liable for an
adverse employment action or failure to accommodate.
The goal of the ADA is to move people with disabilities into
the workforce by lowering discriminatory barriers to their
entry.26 As of July 2010, the unemployment rate for people with
disabilities was 16.4%, compared to 9.5% for people without
disabilities.27  However, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services' statistics show that among adults with serious
mental illness, the unemployment rate has been as high as 90%,
the highest level of any group of people with disabilities. 28 Work
is viewed as vital to an increased enjoyment of life and better
prognosis for many disabling conditions, especially for those
with psychiatric disabilities.29 As such, the spirit of the ADA
recognizes that people with psychiatric disabilities "need
protection from job discrimination to the same degree as those
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii),(iii).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
25. Id. § 12111(3).
26. Lauren J. McGarity, Note, Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities:
Why Side Effects Might Be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALE L.J. 1161, 1164-65
(2000).
27. Economic News Release: Table A-6. Employment Status of the Civilian Population
by Sex, Age, and Disability Status, Not Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t06.htm (last modified Nov. 5,
2010).
28. High Unemployment and Disability for People with Serious Mental Illness
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS (2002), http://mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/publications/allpubs/
nmh020144/unemployment.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).
29. Miller, supra note 6, at 705 (citing Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons
with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 35
(1993)).
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with physical disabilities,"30 but to date, the protection has fallen
short and the inquiry has become muddled when the disability
involved is mental illness.31 Further, as will be discussed,
persons with mental illness face heightened barriers to
employment and to recovery under the ADA, not only because
of social stigma related to their conditions, but also due to the
inquiry as to whether their conditions are mitigated.
HISTORY OF THE ADA AND MENTAL ILLNESS
Not long after the passage of the ADA, even as it was being
called "the most innovative and far-reaching federal civil rights
legislation-ever-on behalf of disabled persons," commentators
had concerns about how the statute would be applied to those
with mental disabilities. 32 One commentator's concerns were
three-fold: (1) the legislative history, early commentaries, and
practice manuals relating to the ADA scarcely acknowledged the
application of the Act to persons with mental disabilities; (2)
when commentators have considered the Act's application to
persons with mental disabilities, the analysis has generally been
limited to persons with mental retardation, rather than those
with mental illness; and (3) no matter how strongly such an Act
is worded, the law's aims cannot be met unless there is a
corresponding change in public attitudes (especially among the
legal system interpreting and enforcing the Act).33 The concern
at the beginning was that unless attitudes toward the disabled,
specifically persons with mental disabilities, changed, the ADA
would "turn out to be little more than the last in a long (and
depressing) series of 'paper victories' for mentally ill
individuals."3 4 The history of the statute has shown this fear to
30. Id. at 710.
31. Id. at 702.
32. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 15 (1993).
33. Id. at 19-20.
34. Id. at 23 (citing Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER
VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIG ITS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary
224 [Vol. 12
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have been realized in a number of ways.
Claimants with mental illness have faced a difficult road
under the ADA. First, fear and misunderstanding of mental
illness abounds both in the general public and in the courts. In
perpetuating the very stereotypes about mental illness that the
ADA sought to eliminate, American courts have failed to protect
persons with psychiatric disabilities from employment
discrimination.35 This fear and misunderstanding has made
those suffering with mental illness less likely to disclose their
illness to their employer, which in turn makes coverage under
the ADA impossible, as the disability must be known by the
employer for reasonable accommodation to occur.36
Another historically troubling development for ADA
claimants with mental illness, especially those that have been
able to hide their conditions while working or functioning on
some level in their occupational roles, is that courts, as a result of
this level of functionality, are unwilling to find that the claimant
has a disability at all; that is, the court finds that the claimant is
not substantially impaired in the major life activity of working.
For example, in Cadelli v. Fort Smith School District, a high school
teacher with a panic disorder was found not to be disabled
under the Rehab Act because his condition had not affected his
ability to complete earlier assignments or fill alternate positions,
so the condition was thus not a substantial impairment and not a
disability.37 This trend is particularly true for the psychiatrically
disabled claimant who manages to control her condition to some
degree with medication.38
In the frustrating alternative, courts have denied ADA
J. Clarke eds., 1976).
35. Stefan, supra note 4, at 273.
36. Miller, supra note 6, at 710-11; see also, Stefan, supra note 4, at 290 (explaining
that applicants and employees with mental illness are "extraordinarily reluctant to
disclose their disabilities" because of the "stigma and shame associated with mental
illness" and because they predominantly believe that "hiding their disabilities
provides far more protection from discrimination than the ADA ever would.").
37. See generally, Cadelli v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 852 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ark.
1993), aff'd 23 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1994).
38. Wiley, supra note 5, at 363.
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coverage to claimants with mental illness who refuse to take
medication or seek treatment on the grounds that they are either
creating their disability or not otherwise qualified for their
position. In Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service, a claimant with
paranoid schizophrenia was found not to be an "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" under the Rehab Act
because, by refusing to treat her condition with medication, she
was, in the court's view, creating her handicap. 9 In Roberts v.
Fairfax, the plaintiff had failed to seek the recommended and
available treatment for his depression, and was thus determined
not to be a "qualified individual with a disability" under the
ADA. 40 Further, Roberts' failure to accept the available treatment
from his employer prevented him from demanding that the
employer offer any other accommodation.4 1
Lower courts around the country came to be divided as to
whether a plaintiff who treats her disability (be it physical or
psychological) must be considered in reference to her untreated
medical state or in reference to her condition after the effects of
ameliorating medications. Before the ADAAA, the text of the
ADA defined a "disability" as an "impairment that . .. limits ...
[a] major life activit[y]." 4 2 Some courts found the statutory
language to be ambiguous and subsequently looked to the
EEOC guidelines for an answer as to how to treat a mitigating
plaintiff. For example, in Arnold v. UPS, the First Circuit held
that the diabetic plaintiff should be considered in his
unmitigated state, even though his medications controlled the
disease to the point where he was not substantially limited in a
major life activity. 43 The court noted that the statute did not
define the terms "impairment," "substantially limits," or "major
life activity" and felt that each term could have more than one
meaning, and that the statute was silent as to whether
39. Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
40. Roberts v. Fairfax, 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.9(d)).
41. Id. at 549.
42. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
43. Arnold v. UPS, 136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998).
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medications should be part of the consideration. 44 The court
ultimately evaluated the statutory language in light of the
legislative intent and "broad remedial purposes" of the statute
and held that the plaintiff's disability should be evaluated based
on his underlying medical condition without considering
mitigating medications. 5
Alternatively, in Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., a district
court decided that the EEOC guidelines were at odds with the
plain language of the statute.46  In that case, the plaintiff
identified his disabilities as hypertension and atrial fibrillation,
both of which were controlled by medication. 47 The court noted
that it was "difficult to see how a condition that has been
ameliorated so that it does not affect an individual's ability to
function normally can be construed as an 'impairment'. . . [and]
even more difficult to see how . . . [it] 'substantially limits' a
major life activity."48 The court went on to affirmatively state
that "an individual who takes medication that prevents a
physical or mental condition from substantially limiting any
major life activities is not disabled within the meaning of the
ADA." 49
Ultimately, eight circuits adopted the EEOC's interpretation
that disabilities should be evaluated in their unmitigated state
when determining the applicability of the ADA.5 o Conversely,
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the position that an
individual's disability should be evaluated in its mitigated state,
and the Fourth Circuit, while not directly adopting the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits' rationale, expressed concern that the EEOC
44. Id. at 859.
45. Id. at 863.
46. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107 (D.R.I. 1997), aff'd
on other grounds, 144 F.3d 151, 173 (1st Cir. 1998) (like Arnold, the appeal went to the
First Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's holding, but noted that it was
affirming on different grounds and that the court "need not decide whether the
district court was correct in . .. deciding that issue should proceed with or without
consideration of Hodgens's ameliorative medications.").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 108.
50. McGarity, supra note 26, at 1168.
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interpretation would make ADA coverage available to those
with relatively minor conditions.7 Thus, courts around the
country were interpreting the ADA with reference to
ameliorative medications in drastically different ways, which
eventually led to the Sutton decision by the Supreme Court.
SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC. AND MEDICATIONS
On the same day in 1999, the Supreme Court released three
rulings related to the use of mitigating measures in ADA cases
that would significantly change who was considered disabled
under the ADA. The leading case in the trilogy, Sutton, involved
severely myopic twin sisters who had applied for positions as
pilots with United Air Lines.52 With corrective lenses, the sisters'
vision was equal to or better than 20/20, but they were denied
positions with the airline regardless and sued under the ADA
claiming discrimination based on their disability.53 The sisters
claimed that their disability substantially limited them in the
major life activity of working and argued that the Court should
comply with the EEOC guidelines and consider their disabilities
in the unmitigated state.54
The Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit's ruling that
the effects of mitigating measures must be taken into account
when determining whether a person is "disabled" under the
ADA.5 5  In determining that the EEOC guidelines were an
"impermissible interpretation of the ADA," the Court
questioned the EEOC's authority to interpret the definition of
"disabled." 56  The Court noted that while the EEOC had
authority to issue regulations to carry out the employment
provisions of Title I, the definition of disability was located in
the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, and no agency
51. Id. at 1168-69.
52. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
53. Id. at 475-76.
54. Id. at 481.
55. Id. at 482.
56. Id. at 471, 482.
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had been given the authority to issue regulations interpreting
the provisions falling outside of Titles I-V.57
The Court then went on to provide three justifications for its
interpretation of the statute. First, the Court stated that "the Act
define[d] a 'disability' as 'a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities' of an
individual"; in noting that the phrase "substantially limits" was
in the present indicative verb tense, the Court felt it was
important that the claimant be "presently-not potentially or
hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a
disability." Thus, if the person's physical or mental impairment
is corrected by a mitigating measure, such as medication or
lenses, then that person is not presently substantially limited
and, therefore, not disabled under the Act.59
Second, the Court remarked that the determination of
whether a person is disabled under the ADA had to be an
individualized inquiry.60 The Court reasoned that an
individualized inquiry would be impossible if courts were
forced to consider claimants in their unmitigated states, as it
would require speculation and the drawing of conclusions based
on "general information about how an uncorrected impairment
usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual
condition"; a process that the majority felt would be "contrary to
both the letter and the spirit of the ADA." 6 1 At this point, the
Court also noted that in failing to consider a claimant in his
unmitigated state, it would be impossible to consider any
negative side effects resulting from the use of mitigating
measures, and gave examples of medications with potentially
disabling side effects, such as antipsychotic drugs.62
Finally, the Court felt that Congress did not intend to
protect all those whose uncorrected conditions would amount to
57. Id. at 478-79.
58. Id. at 482.
59. Id. at 482-83.
60. Id. at 483.
61. Id. at 483-84.
62. Id. at 484.
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disabilities. In the statute's findings, Congress stated that
"43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities"; but the majority felt that this number would have
been much higher had Congress intended to include all those
with "corrected physical limitations."63
The Court further expanded its mitigating measures
rationale in the two companion cases to Sutton. In Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, the plaintiff suffered from hypertension; his
blood pressure reaching 250/160 when unmedicated.6
However, with medication, the plaintiff's blood pressure
measured between 160/102 and 160/104; while still high, the
plaintiff was able to "function[] normally," with the exception of
the prohibition of lifting heavy objects.65 The Court evaluated
the Plaintiff in light of the corrective measure of his medication
and determined that his impairment did not substantially limit a
major life activity and he was, thus, not disabled for the
purposes of the ADA. 6 6
In the final case of the trilogy, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
the Supreme Court again rejected the ADA claim of an
individual whose corrected impairment did not substantially
limit a major life activity. 67 The plaintiff in Kirkingburg had a
visual impairment that effectively rendered him with monocular
vision; however, the plaintiff's brain had subconsciously
developed coping mechanisms to compensate for his visual
problems in sensing depth and peripheral objects.68 The Ninth
Circuit had held that the plaintiff's visual condition constituted a
per se disability. 69 The Supreme Court, however, reversed that
ruling and held that the plaintiff's ability to subconsciously
compensate for his condition must be taken into account before
63. Id. at 484-87.
64. Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999).
65. Id. at 520.
66. Id. at 521.
67. See generally, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
68. Id. at 565-66.
69. Id. at 561.
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determining whether he was disabled. 70 Thus, the Court had in
one day extended the range of mitigating measures that must be
considered from medications to corrective devices to an
individual's ability to compensate for their impairment.
The fallout from the Sutton trilogy decisions was immediate.
The fear was that those plaintiffs who use medications or
medical devices to correct their disabilities would not be covered
by the ADA's protections.71 Indeed, the media interpretations of
the decisions revealed a perception that the Supreme Court had
"rendered the ADA powerless in the workplace." 72 Undeniably,
the Sutton decision moved ADA litigation into a new phase in its
history. Plaintiffs with mental illness were forced to consider
not only how the courts would perceive their illness, but also
how their chosen course of treatment would be viewed. A
mentally ill plaintiff whose condition was controlled by
medication would no longer be considered "disabled" after
Sutton. Should the plaintiff argue that the medications she is
forced to take for her condition are disabling in themselves?
Would it be better for the purposes of the ADA, not to mitigate a
condition at all?
MEDICATIONS AS DISABILITY
Though the Sutton decision seemed to close the door on ADA
coverage for plaintiffs who mitigated their conditions with
medication, there remained some hope for medicated plaintiffs.
One interpretation of the decision was that one of the rationales
underlying the majority's holding was the belief that viewing
plaintiffs in their mitigated state was the only way a court would
be able to "consider any negative side effects suffered by an
individual resulting from the use of mitigating measures." 73 The
hypothesis was that this language would open the door to a new
class of ADA plaintiffs: "[ilndividuals who take medications that
70. Id. at 565-67.
71. McGarity, supra note 26, at 1162.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1162-63 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999)).
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cause extreme drowsiness, nausea, or other severe side effects
would be appropriately considered 'individuals with
disabilities' under this language, as would individuals who have
had corrective surgeries, such as colostomies or hysterectomies,
that give rise to permanently disabling conditions." 74 It seemed
that the Supreme Court was recognizing that medication side
effects could be considered disabilities under the ADA.
In the Sutton opinion, the Court specifically cited three
potentially disabling corrections: antipsychotic drugs, drugs
used to treat Parkinson's disease, and antiepileptic drugs.7 5
Thus, theoretically, though the Court was looking to limit the
pool of potential ADA plaintiffs, it also took pains to ensure that
its decision did not encourage potential plaintiffs to stop
mitigating their disabilities in an effort to meet the statutory
definition of disability, thereby promoting the self-sufficiency of
the disabled that the ADA sought to protect. 76 However, even
before Sutton, courts had considered the disabling side effects of
medication in determining ADA coverage.
Courts that have considered the side effects of medications
as a disability have generally held the side effects to the same
definition of disability as delineated in the statute. For example,
in Hodgens, the plaintiff offered the alternative theory of
disability that he should be deemed disabled because of the
various side effects of his medications.7 7 The court in that case
found no evidence that the side effects of the plaintiff's
medications had substantially limited one of his major life
activities. 78 Thus, though the plaintiff's argument of disability
arose from an origin other than his medical condition, the court
was able to apply the statutory language to the situation in a
similar manner to determine the existence of a disability.
Though the court in Hodgens did not find a disability based on
74. Id. at 1163.
75. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.
76. McGarity, supra note 26, at 1174.
77. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 108 (D.R.I. 1997).
78. Id.
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side effects, its consideration of whether the side effects caused a
disability was evidence that courts were at least willing to
acknowledge the often-debilitating consequences of treatment
faced by ADA plaintiffs. However, the inquiry as to whether
side effects constitute a disability does not always begin and end
with the statutory language.
The EEOC guidelines list three factors to be considered in
determining what constitutes a substantial limitation of a major
life activity: (1) "the nature and severity of the impairment;" (2)
"the duration or expected duration of the impairment;" and (3)
"the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment."79
Thus, even if a plaintiff's side effects were severe enough to
satisfy the first factor, another hurdle would be whether the
duration or permanency of the side effects constituted a
disability. The difficulty with medication side effects after Sutton
was the courts' general unwillingness to grant ADA coverage to
disabilities that may not be permanent (such as chemotherapy)
or may lessen with time (often the case with many medication
side effects).80 Accordingly, though some hoped that mitigating
plaintiffs, such as mentally ill plaintiffs forced to take
medications with often devastating side effects, would still have
some recourse after Sutton, it still seemed as though a mitigating
plaintiff would be effectively barred from coverage by the ADA.
NONMITIGATING PLAINTIFFS
NONMITIGATING PLAINTIFFS BEFORE SUTTON
Before the ADAAA, there was no language in the ADA that
addressed the consideration of mitigating measures, either
plaintiffs that used them or plaintiffs that did not." As such,
before Sutton, lower courts created a "failure to control a
79. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(2) (2009).
80. McGarity, supra note 26, at 1178.
81. Shaw, supra note 7, at 1997.
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controllable disability doctrine," which was used to deny ADA
coverage to nonmitigating plaintiffs. 82 The doctrine developed
inconsistently through the years and was ultimately impacted by
the Sutton decision and again by the ADAAA.
As mentioned earlier in this article, Franklin was a Rehab
Act case that involved a plaintiff with paranoid schizophrenia
who did not medicate her condition.8 3 This was the first case to
hold that a plaintiff who did not use available mitigating
measures was therefore not protected against disability
discrimination.8 4  The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims
under the Rehab Act on two grounds: first, that a person with a
condition such as paranoid schizophrenia that was not
controllable by medication was a danger to the public and
coworkers and was therefore not an "otherwise qualified
handicapped individual;" second, the court held that a person
suffering from a condition that was controllable by medication
who chose not to take that medication was not an "otherwise
qualified handicapped person."8 5 In this way, the court barred
the plaintiff's action on two grounds: either she was a direct
threat or she disqualified herself from coverage under the Rehab
Act by failing to medicate her treatable condition.
The foreclosure of an ADA plaintiff for failure to use
mitigating measures was first indicated in Siefken v. Village of
Arlington Heights.86 In Sieflcen, a police officer experienced a
diabetic episode while on duty that resulted in the erratic
driving of his car at high speeds through a residential area. 7
The plaintiff's episode was the result of a hypoglycemic reaction,
and the police department ultimately terminated him as a result
of his failure to monitor his diabetes.88 The plaintiff had never
82. Id.
83. Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service, 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
84. Shaw, supra note 7, at 1998.
85. Franklin, 687 F. Supp. at 1219.
86. See generally Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.
1995).
87. Id. at 665.
88. Id. at 666.
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requested accommodation from his employer, and the Seventh
Circuit held that "when an employee knows that he is afflicted
with a disability, needs no accommodation from his employer,
and fails to meet 'the employer's legitimate job expectations,'
due to his failure to control a controllable disability, he cannot
state a cause of action under the ADA." 89
The holding in Siefken was really quite narrow, emphasizing
that the proximate cause of Siefken's dismissal was his failure to
control his disease, not the fact that he had the disease.9 o In
addition, the court also suggested that Siefken was not qualified
to perform the essential functions of his job because of his failure
to control his disease.91 Siejken established that the failure of a
plaintiff to control her disability in situations where she will
pose a direct threat to others "renders the employee unqualified
for her position and severs the requisite causal connection
between disability and discrimination." 92 This narrow holding,
however, was expanded by the courts that adopted it to go
beyond situations that involve direct threats and simply deny
ADA coverage to nonmitigating plaintiffs.
For example, the plaintiff in Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co.
was moving on appeal for a new trial on his ADA claim based
on a defense question during the jury trial as to whether his
marijuana use would affect his bipolar medication. 93 The
Seventh Circuit cited Siefken in flatly stating that "[a] plaintiff
cannot recover under the ADA if through his own fault he fails
to control an otherwise controllable illness."94 The court further
noted that proof that the plaintiff's medication would have
controlled his disorder, but for his drug use, would therefore be
relevant.95 Thus, the "Sieflen Rule" came to be applied in
89. Id. at 667 (citing DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir.
1995)).
90. Shaw, supra note 7, at 2000.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2001.
93. Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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nonmitigating plaintiff cases. With the Sutton decision,
however, it appeared as though nonmitigating plaintiffs would
be protected by the ADA, as the decision seemed to foreclose
court speculation about whether available mitigating measures
would be effective for a given plaintiff and instead put the focus
on the plaintiff's actual current state.
NONMITIGATING PLAINTIFFS AFTER SUTTON
As previously mentioned, the Sutton decision directly
addressed the interpretation of the ADA as it applies to
mitigating plaintiffs. There is no requirement in Sutton that
plaintiffs use available mitigating measures, nor is there any
suggestion that plaintiffs who do not mitigate their conditions
must be denied coverage or be evaluated based on a would-be
mitigated state.96 Rather, the Court stressed that whether an
individual is disabled should be considered in light of his
present state, not a hypothetical state where an impairment
"might, could, or would" be substantially limiting.97 In fact, the
Court applied its reasoning to the situation in which a plaintiff
did not use mitigating measures: "[t]he use or nonuse of a
corrective device does not determine whether an individual is
disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations
an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact
substantially limiting."98  Indeed, for a court to deny a
nonmitigating plaintiff coverage based on its belief that she
would not be disabled in a mitigated state, the court would have
to speculate about, for example, whether the treatment would be
effective for that plaintiff, whether the treatment side effects
would substantially limit that plaintiff, and whether the
symptoms of that plaintiff's particular disability would not
prevent her from complying with the appropriate treatment.99
This is precisely the kind of speculation that the Court
96. Shaw, supra note 7, at 2006.
97. Id. at 2007 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
98. Id. (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488 (emphasis in original)).
99. Id. at 2008.
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"condemned as incompatible with an individualized inquiry." 00
A district court in the Ninth Circuit applied the Sutton
reasoning in regards to nonmitigating plaintiffs in Finical v.
Collections Unlimited, Inc.10l In Finical, the plaintiff worked as a
telephone collector for a collections company and had requested
accommodation for her hearing impairment in the form of a
headset that amplified telephone conversations.102 In defense to
her suit claiming discrimination under the ADA, the employer
claimed that the plaintiff was not disabled under the statute
because her condition would have benefitted from the use of
hearing aids (which the plaintiff chose not to wear because they
amplified too much background noise).O3 The court rejected this
argument and cited Sutton for the proposition that it must
conduct an individualized inquiry of the plaintiff in her current
state.104 The court thus refused to engage in speculation as to
whether the plaintiff would benefit from the use of a hearing
aid.
Despite Sutton and subsequent decisions such as Finical,
courts were still able to find ways to deny ADA coverage to
nonmitigating plaintiffs. In Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, the
plaintiff's failure to control her asthma with medication led to
the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 05
The court paid lip service to Sutton by noting the importance of
an individualized inquiry, but it then went on to make
generalized statements about the ease of treatment for most
asthmatics, and failed to consider the plaintiff in her current,
unmitigated state. 06
Further, even after Sutton, courts continue to apply the
Siefken Rule to deny ADA coverage to nonmitigating plaintiffs.
100. Id.
101. See generally Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D.
Ariz. 1999).
102. Id. at 1035, 1038.
103. Id. at 1037.
104. Id. at 1038.
105. Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000).
106. Shaw, supra note 7, at 2014 (citing Tangires, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 595).
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In Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., the plaintiff had
struggled with issues of depression and anxiety and had not
fully availed himself of treatment provided by his employer. 0 7
Upon discharge, the plaintiff sued under the ADA. The court
applied the Siefken Rule and held that because the plaintiff knew
he was afflicted with the disabilities of depression and anxiety,
requested no accommodation from his employer, did not meet
his employer's legitimate job expectation of regular attendance,
and admitted that his conditions would be controllable by
medication, he could not state a cause of action under the
ADA. 08
Similarly, in Nunn v. Illinois State Board of Education, the
court held that the plaintiff did nothing to control her bipolar
disorder, so her recovery under the ADA was therefore
barred.109 The court cast aside the individualized inquiry
requirement of Sutton and found that bipolar disorder is a
treatable condition, that the defendant gave the plaintiff an
opportunity to get treatment but she refused, and that the
plaintiff's decision barred her recovery.110 Thus, courts again
expanded the Siefken holding to encompass situations where
failure to control disabilities precluded ADA protection, even
when that failure did not pose a threat to the safety of others."'
The Sutton decision was unpopular among disability rights
advocates and, as demonstrated, it did little to alleviate much
confusion amongst ADA litigation. As such, nine years after the
Sutton trilogy, Congress passed the ADAAA to further clarify its
intention for the application of the ADA.
107. Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996-99 (S.D.
Ind. 2000).
108. Id. at 1006.
109. Nunn v. 1I. State Bd. of Educ., 448 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
110. Id. at 1001-02.
111. Shaw, ipra note 7, at 2017.
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AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008
GENERAL CHANGES
As previously mentioned, expectations for the ADA were
high, which likely explains why the Act was viewed by
disability rights advocates "as such a huge disappointment,
especially in the employment context."112 It is undisputed that
ADA plaintiffs experience extremely low success rates in Title I
cases. 13 To this point, the greatest constraint on the application
of the ADA has been the definition of "disability." 114 The
original statutory definition was vague and courts interpreted it
narrowly, providing ADA protection to few plaintiffs."' In
response to these developments, Congress passed the ADAAA
in September 2008.116 Congressional intent for the ADAAA is to
expand the definition of disability that had been narrowed by
the Supreme Court in Sutton and clarify its intentions as to the
application of the Act to persons with disabilities in the United
States. 17
The greatest change affected by the ADAAA relates to the
definition of "disability" under the Act. The Amendments
specifically reject the holdings in Sutton and other Supreme
Court cases that narrowed the definition of disability and
required a high burden for the plaintiff and reiterated
Congress's desire for a broad application of the statute." 8 The
Amendments broaden the definition of disability in several
important ways. First, Congress removed the findings that
112. Long, supra note 1, at 217.
113. Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 305, 308 (2008).
114. Long, supra note 1, at 218.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 217.
117. Id.; Reagan S. Bissonnette, Note, Reasonably Accommodating Nonmitigating
Plaintiffs After the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 B.C. L. REV. 859, 859 (2009).
118. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)-(5), 122 Stat.
3553, 3553-54 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
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"some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities" and that "individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority" -language that the Supreme
Court had used in Sutton as justification for narrowing the
definition of disability.119
Second, Congress expressed the purpose of "a broad scope
of protection to be available under the ADA." 120 It expressed its
displeasure at the "inappropriately high level of limitation
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA," and reiterated
that the focus of an ADA case should be on whether covered
entities have complied with their statutory obligations, rather
than conducting an "extensive analysis" of the plaintiff's
impairment.121 The traditional approach to interpreting remedial
statutes is to afford broad interpretation, but the Supreme Court
had seemed to work in direct contravention to that philosophy
in its ADA cases; Congress was attempting to reverse that trend
with the ADAAA.1 22
Third, while the ADAAA left the actual definition of
"disabled" virtually unchanged, the Amendments made changes
to the definitions of surrounding terms. For example, Congress
changed the way the term "substantially limits" is defined by
expressly rejecting the Sutton holding that required that courts
take into account any mitigating measures used by the plaintiff.
Instead, the ADAAA now explicitly states that "determination of
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures," with the exception of "ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses." 123 This will clearly have a positive
effect for mentally ill claimants attempting to control their
conditions with medications, but still suffering discrimination
119. Id. § 3; See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 484, 494 (1999).
120. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(1).
121. Id. § 2(b)(5) (expressly rejecting standard enunciated in Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).
122. Long, supra note 1, at 219 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 504 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
123. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3(4)(E).
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because of their disability. Interestingly, this rejection of Sutton's
holding will allow courts to engage in speculation about the
extent of a plaintiff's condition, even if the plaintiff is using
medication to treat that condition, thus allowing the judicial
speculation that the Supreme Court had prohibited in the Sutton
trilogy.124  Further, Congress has determined that "[a]n
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it
would substantially limit a major life activity when active." 125
For many mental illnesses that are episodic in nature, such as
bipolar disorder or depression, this language provides new hope
for ADA protection. The amendment directs courts to consider
whether an episodic impairment would substantially limit a
major life activity if it were active, again allowing judicial
speculation.126
Fourth, Congress clarified that the EEOC does in fact have
the authority to interpret the definition of "disability" and its
elements, a proposition questioned by the Sutton Court.127
Additionally, the ADAAA includes a nonexhaustive list of major
life activities as an illustration; before the ADAAA, a similar,
though shorter, list was included in the EEOC regulations.128
The ADAAA also made changes to the "regarded as" prong of
the disability definition: instead of having to show that an
employer mistakenly believed that the plaintiff had an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, the
plaintiff now only need show either that the plaintiff's
impairment (regardless of how limiting it actually is) motivated
the employer's adverse action or that the employer perceived
the plaintiff as having an impairment, and that perception
(accurate or not) motivated the adverse action.129
124. Bissonnette, supra note 117, at 872.
125. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(4)(D).
126. Long, supra note 1, at 221.
127. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 6(a)(2).
128. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A).
129. Long, supra note 1, at 224.
2010] 241
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
ADAAA, MEDICATIONS, AND NONMITIGATING PLAINTIFFS
As previously mentioned, the ADAAA offers new hope for
potential ADA plaintiffs who use medications to mitigate their
conditions. A medicated mentally ill plaintiff will theoretically
have one less hurdle to face when bringing an ADA claim.
Moreover, plaintiffs claiming disability due to side effects of
medication will likely face a lower burden under Congress's
broadened scope of protection and lowered plaintiff burden.
Additionally, though the statute does not directly address
nonmitigating plaintiffs, it seems they will conceivably be able to
satisfy the definition of "disabled," since courts would not be
taking mitigating measures into account. However, the true
effect of the ADAAA is a shift in focus from whether an
individual is disabled to whether she is a "qualified individual"
under the statute.130
The determination of a "qualified individual," especially as
it relates to nonmitigating plaintiffs, is not well defined in the
statute. 131 Implicit in the determination of a qualified individual
is the "reasonable" accommodation provided by the employer;
however, the statute does not provide a clear standard as to
what constitutes "reasonable" accommodation.132
Accommodation issues are inherently fact-specific, and the
majority of ADA precedent to this point has focused on
qualifying the plaintiff as disabled, rather than on
accommodation, leaving a lack of clear guidance on the
subject.13 3 In regards to a nonmitigating plaintiff, some argue
that courts will now have to determine whether the plaintiff's
decision not to mitigate was more reasonable than the
employer's proffered accommodation.1 4
As courts and scholars have grappled with the issue of
130. Bissonnette, supra note 117, at 885.
131. Id.
132. Long, supra note 1, at 228.
133. Id. at 228-29.
134. Bissonnette, supra note 117, at 885.
242 [Vol. 12
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITES ACT
nonmitigating plaintiffs over the years, and with the passage of
the ADAAA, theories have emerged that suggest that
nonmitigating plaintiffs should bear some burden to reasonably
mitigate their conditions before requiring an employer to
provide reasonable accommodation. 135 The question is whether
an employer must always accommodate a plaintiff who chooses
not to mitigate a condition that may legitimately be alleviated by
treatment. One theory called for a balancing of the burdens of
accommodation versus mitigation between the employer and
the plaintiff;13 6 another theory would allow the employer, after
the plaintiff has made his prima facie case, to show that
mitigating measures are more reasonable than an
accommodation by the employer;137 and yet another theory
would compare the plaintiff's decision not to mitigate to what a
"reasonable person" would do in the same situation.s38 These
proposals claim to be consistent with public policy in requiring
that the plaintiffs help themselves to some degree before turning
to their employers or the courts for accommodation.139
All of these proposals, however, run counter to the spirit of
the ADA, especially in light of the passage of the ADAAA. In
the ADAAA, Congress specifically stated its intent that a "broad
scope of protection ... be available under the ADA" and further
stated that the "primary object of attention" in ADA cases is
whether covered entities "complied with their obligations." 40
Thus, it is logical to assume that Congress intended for courts to
consider the employer's actions in offering reasonable
accommodations, rather than whether the plaintiff's decision to
135. Id. at 885.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 890 (citing Debra Burke & Malcolm Abel, Ameliorating Medication and
ADA Protection: Use It and Lose It or Refuse It and Lose It?, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 785, 817
(2001)).
138. Id. at 890 (citing Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REV. 217, 219 (2004) and Lisa E. Key, Voluntary
Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable Interpretation of "Reasonable Accommodations,"
48 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 96-97 (1996)).
139. Id. at 889.
140. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553,
3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
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mitigate was reasonable. Additionally, some argue that the term
"reasonable" modifies the term "accommodation" and has
nothing to do with an evaluation of the employee's actions.14 1
In tandem with this expanded coverage, however, is
employer protection in the form of the definition of "reasonable
accommodation," both in the statute and the EEOC regulations.
The statute provides a short, illustrative list of reasonable
accommodations, while the regulations provide for a more
specific definition, referring to a "qualified [individual or]
applicant."142 Consequently, a nonmitigating plaintiff would not
be able to make outlandish accommodation demands of her
employer, as a statutory interpretation would likely deem them
to be unreasonable. Employers have further protection, as they
do not need to provide reasonable accommodation in cases of
undue hardship, direct threat, or cases of misconduct stemming
from drug or alcohol use. 4 1
Further, any test balancing the reasonableness of a
plaintiff's decision not to mitigate would raise very real concerns
about judicial or employer "second guessing" of employee
medical decisions. 14 4 This situation would allow potential bias to
creep into the decision making process of an individual; in the
case of a person dealing with mental illness, the prevailing
employer and judicial stereotypes about mental illness could
prove fatal to any claim. 1 45 Additionally, employer or judicial
involvement in medical decision making would run counter to
the ADA's "goal of enhancing the independence and autonomy
of individuals with disabilities."1 46 Thus, even in the absence of
statutory guidance of what constitutes "reasonable
accommodation," nonmitigating plaintiffs should still be able to
argue that employers accommodate their disabilities, as long as
141. Shaw, supra note 7, at 2034.
142. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2009);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2009).
143. Shaw, supra note 7, at 2025.
144. McGarity, supra note 26, at 1186.
145. Id.; see also Stefan, supra note 4, at 272.
146. McGarity, supra note 26, at 1187.
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they are "qualified individual [s]."
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the ADA prior to 2008 left many feeling
that the statute was a failure in terms of rights for individuals
with disabilities, and those with mental illness in particular.
After the ADAAA, Congress has opened the door for ADA
protection of both mitigated and nonmitigated plaintiffs with
mental illness. These plaintiffs still face two significant
remaining issues: (1) the continuing stigma related to mental
illness that permeates both employment and judicial decisions;
and (2) in terms of nonmitigating plaintiffs, with the judicial
focus shifted from the definition of "disabled" to "reasonable
accommodation," plaintiffs may now have to justify whether
their decision not to mitigate is reasonable.
The stigma faced by individuals and plaintiffs with mental
illness is one of the very issues that the ADA seeks to address.
As one commentator has pointed out, "[t]he simple official
repudiation of discriminatory practices is not enough to
significantly alter the distorted cognitive processes that still
frequently dominate our thinking and decision-making." 147 The
ADA was the beginning of equal treatment for people with
disabilities, but attitudes and beliefs (especially as they relate to
people with mental illness) must be adjusted so that statutory
interpretation will lead to the realization of the ADA's goals.148
At this point, it seems that courts have forgotten this notion
when making coverage decisions. The hope is that the ADAAA
will remove the barriers of mitigating measures and episodic
conditions that courts have used in the past to deny ADA
coverage to plaintiffs with mental illness.
For plaintiffs with mental illness that choose not to mitigate
their conditions, it may be easier to be classified as a person with
a "disability," but more difficult to prove what would be a
147. Perlin, supra note 32, at 22.
148. See generally id. at 22-23.
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reasonable accommodation in that situation. Courts can use the
individualized inquiry demanded by the statute to determine
what is reasonable in each situation without implementing any
kind of new balancing test that places an onus on the plaintiff
that Congress never intended. Only time will tell if the ADAAA
will improve plaintiff coverage in ADA cases. Most of the cases
on appeal at this point are still being decided under the ADA
before the amendments, so little has been seen of the new effect.
While the ADAAA left some questions open, hopefully the
interpretation of the amended ADA going forward will provide
greater coverage to people with disabilities of all kinds, as
Congress intended, and especially to those with mental illness.
